Duquesne Law Review
Volume 36

Number 4

Article 9

1998

Constitutional Law - Procedural Due Process - Employment Suspension - State Employees
Matthew Q. Ammon

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew Q. Ammon, Constitutional Law - Procedural Due Process - Employment - Suspension - State
Employees, 36 Duq. L. Rev. 951 (1998).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol36/iss4/9

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Recent Decisions

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -

EMPLOYMENT -

The Supreme Court of the
United States held that a state university employee suspended
without pay due to his arrest on drug-related charges was not
entitled under the Due Process Clause to notice and a hearing prior
to his suspension.
SUSPENSION

-

STATE

EMPLOYEES

-

Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997).
East Stroudsburg University ("ESU") employed Richard J. Homar
("Homar") as a campus police officer.' On August 26, 1992, while at
the home of a friend, police arrested and charged Homar with
possession of marijuana, possession with intent to deliver, and
criminal conspiracy to violate the controlled substance law.2 Police
notified Homar's supervisor, David Marazas ("Marazas"), of Homar's
arrest and the charges pending against him.3 Marazas then notified
Gerald Levanowitz ("Levanowitz"), the University's Director of
Human Resources, who immediately suspended Homar without
pay.4 On August 27, 1992, Homar called Marazas and learned of his
suspension.' Police dismissed the charges against Homar on
1.

Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1810 (1997). ESU is a university in Pennsylvania.

Id.
2. Id. at 1810. Officers of the Pennsylvania State Police arrested Homar as part of a
drug raid on the premises. Id.
3. Id. Marazas was Chief of ESU's University's Police. Id.
4. Id. ESU President James Gilbert ("Gilbert") had given Levanowitz the power to
discipline University employees. Id.
5. Id. Homar also received a letter from Levanowitz, confirming that his suspension
was effective on August 26, 1992, the day before he spoke to Marazas. Id. Levanowitz's letter
stated that Homar would be suspended during the investigation into the charges against him.
Id. It also explained that ESU reserved 6e right to take action against Homar that did not
necessarily relate to the status of the criminal charges. Id.
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September 1, 1992, but his suspension from ESU remained in
6
effect.
Homar had an opportunity to give his rendition of the events to
his employer on September 18, 1992 when he met with Levanowitz
and Marazas. 7 Levanowitz and Marazas informed Homar that they
had received very serious information about him from the state
police. 8 They did not tell Homar, however, that the information
included an alleged confession he had made the day the police
arrested him.9 Levanowitz notified Homar, in a letter dated
September 23, 1992, of his immediate demotion to groundskeeper
based upon admissions he had allegedly made to the police.10 The
president of Homar's union met with ESU President James Gilbert
on September 24, 1992.11 During this meeting, Homar first learned
of his "confession."12
Homar filed suit against Gilbert, Marazas, Levanowitz, and Curtis
English ("English"), Vice President of ESU, under 42 U.S.C. section
1983, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. 13 Judge Vanaskie entered summary judgment for the
ESU officials (collectively "Gilbert"). 14 Homar appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 5
Gilbert appealed the decision of the Third Circuit, and the Supreme
6
Court of the United States granted certiorari.1
6. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1810. ESU's investigation was still continuing at this time. Id.
7. Id. at 1810.
8. Id.
9. Id. Therefore, Homar was unable to defend himself against these allegations. Id.
10. Id. The letter also stated that Homar would receive back pay from the date of his
suspension, but at the pay rate of a groundskeeper. Id. However, Homar eventually received
back pay at the rate of his former position, a police officer. Id. The letter informed Homar
that the demotion was made
as a result of admissions made by yourself to the Pennsylvania State Police on August
26, 1992 that you maintained associations with individuals whom you knew were
dealing in large quantities of marijuana and that you obtained marijuana from one of
those individuals for your own use. Your actions constitute a clear and flagrant
violation of Sections 200 and 200.2 of the [ESUI Police Department Manual.
Id. at 1810-11.
11. Id. at 1811.
12. Id. at 1811. Gilbert gave Homar a chance to respond to the allegations, but
sustained his demotion. Id.
13. Id. Homar's claims were against the ESU officials in their official and individual
capacities. Id. Homar contended that his due process rights were violated when ESU
suspended him without pay without providing him with notice and before he was granted an
opportunity to explain his side of the story. Id.
14. Id.
15. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1811.
16. Id. "Certiorari" is a discretionary device used by a superior court to require an
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The Court considered whether the government violates a state
employee's right to due process when he is suspended without pay
and without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing on the
charges against him.' 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted
that due process protects government employees who have a
property interest in their tenure. 8 However, the Court recognized
that it had never decided whether these due process protections
also extended to suspensions. 9 Justice Scalia examined the Third
Circuit's holding that a government employee is entitled to a
pre-suspension hearing when suspended without pay, to ensure that
the government affords the employee notice and the opportunity to
plead his case. 20 The Court questioned this broad rule and noted
that Homar did not defend the Court of Appeals' position. 2' Justice
Scalia cited precedent that held if giving notice is impractical or if
immediate action is required, no predeprivation notice is necessary,
if postdeprivation process satisfies due process requirements.?
The Court then determined the factors necessary for determining
the type of process that is due: (1) the private interest affected; (2)
the risk associated with any errant deprivation of that interest and
inferior court to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein in order to
review the proceedings and determine whether any irregularities exist. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Id. at 1810.
18. Id at 1811. Public employees who may be dismissed only for "cause" have a
protected property interest in their tenured positions, and dismissal without due process
violates this interest. Id. (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972)).
19. Id. The petitioners (ESU officials) in Homar did not challenge the existence of a
protected property interest when suspension (and not termination) is the alleged violation.
Id. Thus, the Court assumed that there was a violation of Homar's property interest in his
tenure when he was suspended without pay. Id.
20. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1811. The Third Circuit relied on Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that a
government employee dismissible only for cause is entitled to a pre-suspension hearing with
a more in-depth post-suspension hearing to follow. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct at 1811 (citing
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985)). The pre-suspension
hearing guards against dismissal if the charges are false, and involves only written or oral
notice of the charges and the evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to give his
rendition of the events. Id. However, an employer may forgo the pre-suspension hearing and
suspend the employee with pay. Id.
21. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1811-12.
22. Id. at 1812 (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,
510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S.
55, 64-65 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977); North American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 314-20 (1908); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. (1981); FDIC v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230 (1988)).
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the value of any procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's
interest in the matter.2 Homar argued that he had an interest in
receiving a paycheck on a regular basis, but the Court found that
he faced only a temporary deprivation of pay.2 4 The Court then
examined the government's interest, concluding that the State's
interest is great when public employees in positions of trust and
high visibility are charged with felonies. 25 Justice Scalia's
examination of the third factor briefly discussed an Executive
Order issued by the Governor of Pennsylvania. 26 Justice Scalia
concluded that an arrest and formal charge is sufficient to create a
reasonable belief that the employee committed the crime and to
guard against any erroneous deprivation.27 Despite Homar's
contention that Levanowitz should have given him the opportunity
to explain his actions, the Court did not agree and found that no
pre-suspension hearing was necessary to protect Homar's
interests. 28 Justice Scalia distinguished a termination from a
23. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1812. Justice Scalia relied on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976), FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988), and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982). Id.
24. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1813. Justice Scalia focused on the fact that Mallen and
Loudermill determined the need for a finding as to the length of the deprivation. Id. He
reasoned that as long as there is a prompt post-suspension hearing, the lost income is
relatively nominal, benefits are not affected, and there is no real interest affected. Id.
25. Id. Homar would have preferred suspension with pay, but Justice Scalia believed
that this would give employees charged with a felony, 'a paid leave at taxpayer expense." Id.
When an employee can provide no valuable service to the employer after charges are filed,
the Court would not have the employer shoulder the burden of continued payment. Id.
Justice Scalia also gave deference to ESU's interest in preserving public confidence in its
police force (making an analogy to the state's interest in preserving the good name of horse
racing), a sufficiently important interest to justify suspension prior to a hearing. Id. (citing
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988)).
26. Id. Under that order, according to the ESU officials, a state employee is to be
suspended without pay as soon as practical after being formally charged with a felony. Id.
(citing 4 PA. CODE § 7.173 (1997)). Homar contended that the order is merely suggestive and
not binding upon the state employer. Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1813. Justice Scalia found no
urgent reason to decide this dispute because there was no constitutional obligation to
provide Homar with a pre-suspension hearing. Id.
27. Id. at 1814. Justice Scalia found that the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing was
to assure that adequate grounds existed for suspension without pay. Id. at 1813. He then
determined that arrest and formal charges serve the same purpose, and an indictment further
bolsters the reliability of the charges, because an independent third party (the police) has
determined that probable cause exists to believe the accused committed the crime. Id. at
1814.
28. Id. Levanowitz had discretion whether to suspend Homar, and Homar contended
that this fact made a pre-suspension hearing necessary. Id. Justice Scalia noted that in
Mallen, the FDIC had discretion whether to suspend its employee and the Court still found
no necessity to provide for a pre-suspension hearing. Id. (citing FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. at
234-35; 64 Stat. 879, as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1)).
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suspension by finding that in a termination, the only way to permit
a decisionmaker to exercise his or her discretion is to provide for a
pre-ternination hearing. 29
Homar's argued that prompt action is necessary to prevent a
prolonged suspension, but the Court found this argument supports
the idea that a prompt post-suspension hearing will guard against
any real harm to an employee's interest.30 Justice Scalia found that
whether Homar actually received a prompt post-suspension hearing
was a separate question that neither the district court nor the Third
Circuit had addressed. 31 Therefore, the Court, in holding that a
state employee is not entitled to due process protection from
suspension without pay without prior notice and hearing when
arrested on felony drug charges, reversed the judgment of the Third
Circuits and remanded for consideration of whether Homar
32
received a prompt post-suspension hearing.
In Goldberg v. Kelly,3 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether procedural due process is required before
discontinuing welfare payments. 34 The Goldberg Court examined
whether the government denied procedural due process to a public
assistance recipient by terminating payments without a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing. 35 In an opinion authored by
Justice Brennan, the Court held that due process requires a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare
payments, and that a post-termination hearing is not enough to
36
protect the recipient's due process guarantees.
The Court found that welfare provides the necessary money for
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and that termination of
these benefits may deprive the recipient of the required means to
29. GCibert, 117 S. Ct. at 1814. In the case of a suspension, there is the opportunity to
invoke the discretion later, and a delay actually is a benefit to the suspended employee
whereby he has the opportunity to seek clarification about the arrest and charges. Id. Justice
Scalia determined that Homar had an interest in the speedy determination of his situation
but that forcing an employer to act too quickly might work against an employee's interests
by causing too much emphasis to be placed on the public perception of a felony charge. Id.
(citing FDIC v.Mallen, 486 U.S. at 243).
30.

Id.

31. Id. The Court has previously held that 90 days is not an overly long period to wait
for a post-suspension hearing. Id. (citing FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 243).
32. Id. at 1814-15.
33. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
34. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
35. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255.
36. Id. at 261.

Duquesne Law Review
live.37 It found that the government's interest in

Vol. 36:951
conserving

resources does not outweigh the private interests involved.3 The
Court also expressed concern that the stakes are too high to
terminate assistance without a chance for the recipient to protest
and produce evidence of need.39 Justice Brennan determined that
the pre-termination appearance serves to evaluate the validity of
the discontinuance, and that an in-person appearance may replace4
written submissions that are not an option for illiterate recipients. 0
He concluded that welfare recipients are entitled to a
predeprivation evidentiary hearing to comport with due process
4
rights fully.

1

In Mathews v. Eldridge,42 the Supreme Court of the United States
determined the requisite due process to be afforded under a
particular set of facts and circumstances.43 The Court in Eldridge
explored whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing to a Social
Security disability benefit recipient prior to termination of his
benefits." Justice Powell, writing for the Court, held that no
evidentiary hearing is required before termination of disability
benefits and that present administrative procedures fully satisfy due
45
process guarantees.
The Eldridge Court noted that it has not always insisted upon a
pre-termination hearing, but some type of procedure based upon a
factual determination." The Court devised three factors for
examination when due process is at issue: the private interest
37. Id. at 264.
38. -Id. at 265. In fact, it is a social policy to assist the impoverished, and any concern
about money can be reduced with prompt post-termination hearings. Id. at 265-66.
39. Id. at 266.
40. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269. Another benefit of an in-person appearance is the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 270.
41. Id.
42. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
43. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
44. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323.
45. Id. at 349. An unsatisfied worker must provide a medical assessment of his physical
or mental condition stating that he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." Id. at 343 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (Supp. 111 1970)). The State Social Security Agency ("SSA") also sends a
detailed questionnaire to the worker to substitute for a personal appearance. Id. at 345. The
worker also has full access to all information gathered by the SSA. Id. at 34546. Prior to
termination of benefits, the SSA informs the worker of its decision, the rationale, and any
evidence relied upon. Id. at 346. Workers may then challenge the information and the SS/s
conclusions. Id.
46. Id. at 334 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
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affected; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property rights if
the procedures provided are used and the value of any safeguards
afforded; and the government's interest.4 7 Justice Powell determined
that the private interest affected was the uninterrupted receipt of
income.48 He found a small risk of wrongful deprivation under the
facts because the government required medical assessments from
unbiased physicians, the recipient had a chance to respond through
a questionnaire, and the recipient had the opportunity to examine
all records. 49 The government's interest in the dispute, according to
the Court, was the risk of increased cost associated with hearings
prior to termination of benefits and the required payments while
decisions are pending. 50
The Court distinguished the private interest from the public
interest in Goldberg, by noting that eligibility for benefits in
Goldberg was based upon financial need, while the interest in
Eldridge was based upon disability.5 1 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the existing procedures were adequate and no due
process violations would occur without a pre-termination hearing. 52
The Supreme Court of the United States directly applied the
Eldridge test in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.5 The
issue before the Court in Loudermill was what pre-termination
process the government must accord a public employee dismissible
only for cause.M The Court held that the only process due was a
pre-termination opportunity to respond, coupled with
post-termination administrative procedures.55
47. Id.at 335.
48. Id. at 340. The Court noted that the hardship imposed upon a recipient who is
wrongfully deprived is significant, but that other sources of government assistance exist,
such as welfare and food stamps. Id. at 342-43 n.27.
49. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-46. The Court felt that the value of a hearing was
diminished because of these safeguards. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 340-41. The Court found this to be not as significant a deprivation as that in
Goldberg. Id.
52. Id. at 349.
53. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
54. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535.
55. Id. at 547-48. The Ohio statute which creates the property right provides that
dismissed employees be provided with a copy of the removal order along with the reasons
cited, which is dually filed with the Director of Administrative Services. Id. at 53940 n.6.
Within ten days of that filing, the dismissed employee may file an appeal with the State
Personnel Board of review or the Cleveland Civil Service Commission. Id. The Board or
Commission notifies the employer and schedules a hearing within thirty days of the
employee's filing. Id. After hearing the dispute, the Board or Commission may affirm,
disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the employer. Id. If a party remains unsatisfied, they
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The Court in Loudermill stated that state law creates property
interests,56 and then went on to apply the Eldridge test.5 7 The Court
found that the private interest at stake in Loudermill was
continued employment, and that wrongful deprivation would cause
severe consequences.1s The Government's interest in limiting
administrative burdens and delays, the Court concluded, did not
outweigh the private interests.19 The Court noted that an employer
concerned with the hazard of a particular employee remaining on
the job may suspend him with pay.60 In light of these interests, the
Court required a pre-termination hearing that included notice and
an opportunity to respond, relying upon the existence of a full,
post-termination hearing to protect the worker's due process rights
fully.61
Although the Court faced a deprivation of employment in
Loudermill, the situation was different from in the instant case. 62 In
Loudermill, the government terminated an employee for lying on
his job application about a previous felony conviction.63 Homar was
suspended due to his arrest, while employed at ESU, on drug
charges. 64 The difference in severity is in the time of the
occurrence of the improper act. The Loudermill Court did not
necessarily agree with Loudermill's actions, but merely ordered
pre-termination process.6 Here, the Court found that no
predeprivation process was necessary, because as Justice Scalia
stated, "for present purposes arrest and charge give reason enough.
may file an appeal in the State Court of Common Pleas. Id.
56.

Id. at 538.

57. Id. at 542. For a description of the Eldridge test, see the analysis of Mathews v.
Eldridge, supm note 44 and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 542-43. The Court reasoned that dismissals often involve factual disputes,
which serves to bolster the argument that employees should have the opportunity to present
their side of the story, even if success is not probable. Id. at 543-44.
59. Loudermil, 470 U.S. at 544. The Court added that the government has an interest
in avoiding disruptions in the workplace, as it is better to keep a skilled employee than train
a new replacement. Id. An interest also exists in keeping its citizens gainfully employed
rather than on public assistance. Id.
60. Id. at 545.
61. Id. at 545-46. Any more process, the Court noted, would intrude upon the
government's interest. Id. at 546.
62. Id. at 532.
63. Id. at 535. The dishonest act was discovered after Loudermill had been working for
eleven months. Id.
64. Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1810 (1997). Homar was accused of possession
and possession with the intent to deliver marijuana, and criminal conspiracy, all acts
supposedly occurring while Homar was actively employed at ESU. Id.
65. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48.
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They serve to assure that the state employer's decision to suspend
the employee is not 'baseless or unwarranted,' in that an
independent third party has determined that there is probable
cause to believe the employee committed a serious crime."6
Although the government later dismissed the charges against
Homar 67 and Loudermill was actually convicted of grand larceny,6
it appears that the Homar Court may have put greater weight on
the fact that Homar was charged with a crime while employed by
the state, while Loudermill was convicted of a felony before his
employment began.
This view is supported by Justice Scalia's holding that the Court
sanction paid vacations for government employees at taxpayers'
expense.r 9 He also noted the importance of maintaining public
confidence in ESU's police force.70
Justice Ginsburg, during oral argument, questioned the increased
costs to the state that would result from requiring predeprivation
hearings.7 1 Her question suggests that the Court's view is that the
threat of improper conduct by a current government employee is
more serious, from the government's point of view as the employer,
than actual improper conduct before the government employs a
worker.
The Court dealt with a different type of deprivation in Homar
7 2 or in Eldridge.
73 In Homar, the government
than that in Goldberg
suspended an employee from his employment, while in Goldberg
and Eldridge, the government terminated purely economic
benefits.74 This may serve as an explanation of why the Court
afforded no predeprivation process to Homar.
The interests threatened in Goldberg and Eldridge are more
necessary to basic survival than the Homar's property interest in
his employment, because the government awards welfare and
Social Security benefits only after a showing of need. 75 Without
66.
67.
68.
69.

Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1813-14 (quoting FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988)).
Id. at 1810.
Loudermili, 470 U.S. at 535.
Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1813.

70.

Id.

71. Gilbert v. Homar, No. 96-651, 1997 WL 143823, at *34 (1997).
72. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
73. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
74. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
75. Most often, these benefits are awarded to people who cannot work due to various
considerations. For example, welfare is sometimes awarded to parents in need to provide
support for their children. Social Security benefits are awarded due to a disability that
prevents the recipient from worldng.
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these government-furnished benefits, recipients may not have any
other means of providing basic support for themselves.
However, suspension from one's job is not as severe. Although
the suspended employee may not be able to work at his or her
current place of employment, other positions are available.
Suspended employees, unlike welfare or Social Security recipients,
are capable of supporting themselves adequately by working.
6
The Court's holding in Gilbert v. Homar was correct.
Government employers should have the ability to remove
problematic employees without delay when they jeopardize the
state's interests in maintaining the public trust and reducing costs
to taxpayers. If the charges against the employee are found to be
false, the government should promptly return the employee to the
same relative status he would have been in had the state not taken
action, including back pay and reimbursement for expenses
incurred that the employer would have covered as benefits. Prompt
postdeprivation process ensures that the deprivation, if groundless,
will be corrected before any permanent damage to the employee
can occur.
The next logical step is to extend the Homar rule to
non-government employees as well. Private employees do not differ
much from their state counterparts in that both share the same
interests in continued employment and an opportunity to plead
their case. Private employers also have many of the same interests
as state employers. Public opinion is equally important to private
employers because they rely on consumers' opinions as expressed
by their spending. Because private employers are in business
primarily to make a profit, the interest of preventing potential
troublemakers from receiving paid vacations is also very important.
The Court should not hesitate to extend the Homar rule to private
employees.
Matthew Q. Ammon

76.

117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997).

